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JEL Codes: F12, D43, L13
Abstract:
The impact of changes in the number of foreign/domestic firms, in the extent of 
product differentiation, and of use of price-setting vs. quantity-setting behavior on the 
passthrough of exchange rate fluctuations is examined for trade between oligopolistic markets



























































































































































































One of the questions addressed in the growing literature on the consequences of imperfect 
competition for trade flows is the relationship between market structure and the passthrough 
of fluctuations in exchange rates to domestic prices.
Like Dombusch [1987, p. 93|, we assume an exogenous movement in the nominal 
exchange rate. This movement causes a change in the relative costs of foreign and domestic- 
firms, leading to a shift of the reaction surfaces of foreign firms and movements along the 
reaction surfaces of domestic firms. Our model, like that of Dornbusch. allows us to 
investigate the impact of changes in market concentration (the number of firms) on the 
magnitude of passthrough effects. We allow foreign goods to be imperfect substitutes or 
complements for domestic goods, which permits us to examine the way changes in demand 
relationships affect the passthrough relationship. Extensions of the model examine the impact 
of price-setting behavior and of economies of scale on exchange rate passthroughs.1
II. The Basic Model
1. Substitutability Between Domestic and Foreign Varieties
Consider a partial equilibrium model of trade between 2 countries, A and B. There 
are nA firms in the country A industry and n, firms in the country B industry.
We want to treat the case of differentiated products. Starting from the case of linear 
(inverse) demand with homogeneous products,




























































































a straightforward generalization is to write an inverse demand curve for the variety of a 
differentiated product group sold by firm A 1 in market A as2
In this specification, 6 is a product differentiation parameter. 6 = 1 implies that products 
are perfect substitutes (i.e., reduces to (1)), while 0 =  0 means goods are completely 
independent in demand. 0 <  0 covers the case of complementary goods. Without loss of 
generality, the slope coefficient of q„, is normalized at -1.
With a specification of this kind, it is natural to ask how changes in 0 affect market 
equilibrium. For our specific purpose, it is natural to ask how changes in 0 affect the 
equilibrium passthrough of exchange rate fluctuations to domestic prices. But (2) has the 
implication that an increase in 0 means (a) foreign goods become better substitutes for variety 
A1; and simultaneously (b) all other domestic varieties become better substitutes for variety 
A l. The way a change in 0 affects the exchange rate passthrough (and, indeed, other 
structure-conduct-performance relationships) therefore depends on aspects of both domestic 
and foreign market structure.
To avoid this convolution of demand-side relationships, when we examine substitute 
goods we generalize (2) to obtain inverse demand curves which permit the degree of 
substitutability among domestic varieties and the degree of substitutability between domestic 
and foreign varieties to differ:






























































































P B i = a  -  XBj + + 6E XBJ •> = !&■■■*„ (3b)
i=l
is the country A price, and <y* the country A sales, of country A firm i; p Hl is the country 
A price, and x,, the country A sales, of country B firm j .  As in (2). 0 is a product 
differentiation parameter, now specific to domestic varieties, lying between zero and one. i|i. 
also lying between zero and one. measures the degree of differentiation between domestic and 
foreign varieties in the country A market. We assume 0 > i£: domestic varieties are better 
substitutes for one another than are foreign varieties.
We begin with the case of constant marginal cost. This implies that protit-maximizing 
behavior in each market can be examined separately. We will henceforth focus on country 
A.
Whether products are strategic substitutes or strategic complements depends on the 
sign of (for example)
(Bulou', Geanakoplos. and Klemperer |1985|). If derivatives of the form (4) are negative, 
an increase in a rival firm's sales reduces the marginal profitability of firm Ai. The varieties 
are then strategic substitutes. If the derivatives are positive, an increase in a rival firm's sales 
increases the marginal profitability of firm Ai. For the linear inverse demand curves (3) and 
constant marginal cost, these derivatives are negatively proportional to 0 (if the outer 





























































































to a foreign variety). This specification has two advantages. First, demand and strategic 
substitutability (complementarity) coincide. Second, strategic complementarity ( ♦  <  0) is 
not ruled out with linear demands, in contrast with the case of linear demand curves and 
homogeneous commodities (see Kirman and Phlips [1992, p. 4j).
2. Demand Curves
Let the country A currency be pounds, the country B currency be dollars, and the 
exchange rate e the number of pounds per dollar. An increase in e therefore represents a 
depreciation of the country A currency.
Let c„ be the marginal cost of a country A firm, measured in pounds, and c„ the 
marginal cost of a country B firm, measured in dollars. t„A is unit tariff and transportation 
cost, also measured in dollars, incurred shipping from B to A. c, + t,A is the marginal 
cost of a country B firm to supply a unit of output to country A. In what follows, we assume 
a > cA and a > e(c. + t,J .
Firm Ai’s pound profit in country A is
"ai * (Pm - 'A**Ai * (5)
The dollar profit of country B firm Bj from sales in country A is
(6)






























































































Consider first the case of substitute goods: 6 >  i|r >  0. Substituting from the 
inverse demand curve (3a) in (5) gives an expression for firm /I f  s profit in terms of its ow n 
output and the outputs of other firms. Maximization of this expression w ith respect to q,, 
gives the equation of firm Ai's  quantity reaction function in country A:
n A n B
2«At + + xBj = a (?a)
k+i /«1
In the same way. firm B js quantity reaction function in country A is
n A n B
2*» + * E « a i  + eE xa, = a * = •i-1 k*j
(7b)
Now impose country-specific symmetry: since all country A firms produce with the same 
cost, and all country B firms produce with the same cost, in equilibrium qM =  q, and 
xBj = x,. By imposing these conditions outside of equilibrium, it becomes possible to graph 
condensed reaction curves that determine country A equilibrium. The equations of the 
condensed reaction curves are




























































































nÂ \iqA + [2 + (nB -  l)0Jxa = a -  z ■ (8b)
They are graphed in Figure 1.
Two types of conditions must be met for the condensed reaction functions to have the 
indicated configuration, implying positive equilibrium outputs for firms of both countries. 
For the country A reaction curve to be steeper than the country B reaction curve, it must be 
that
DET1 = (2 -  6)[2 + (nA + n„ -  1)0] + n,ng(62 -  qr2) > 0 . (9)
For the intercepts of the reaction curves to have the indicated relationship, it must be
that
[1 + (nB -  l)0](a -  cA) -  t|rns(<? -  z) > 0 (10a)
(1 + (nA -  1)0](a -  z) -  * nA(a -  cA) > 0. (10b)
2
These conditions are met provided that there is positive demand for each variety if all 
varieties price at marginal cost,3 which we henceforth assume.
Equilibrium sales are






























































































[2 + (nA -  l)8](a -  z) -  ^ ( a  -  cA) 
DET1
( l ib )
Country-specific symmetry implies that in equilibrium all country A firms will charge the 
same price and all country B firms will charge the same price. Substituting from (11) into 
the equations of the inverse demand curves, we obtain country A equilibrium prices for 
Cournot quantity-setting oligopoly with imperfectly substitutable goods:4
Pa




[2 * (nA -  l)6](fl -  z) -  n4i|i(a -  cA) 
DET1
(12b)
2. Exchange Rate Comparative Statics
Exchange rate fluctuations translate into proportional fluctuations in z =  e(c, + t„). 
From (12).
& a _ > 0 .
dz DET1
(13)






























































































A little algebra shows that
> 0 . 05)
For substitute goods, a depreciation of the home-country currency results in a partial increase 
in the price of foreign goods and what might be termed a sympathetic increase in the price 
of competing domestic goods. From (13) and (14). we obtain
dPB a
(2 -  6)[2 + (nA + n ,  + 1)6] -  n / l  + n,(0 + >101(6 - » ) > q ° 6) 
DET1 >
An increase in e leads to a relative increase in price of foreign goods.
The magnitude of passthrough effects depends on nA, nB, 0, and i(r. From (13).
J _  1 - ^ * - [ ( 2  -  0)6 + n /6 2 -  Hr2)] < 0 ; 
DETl2
(17a)
_ 3 _ ( * a )  = (2 -  0)[2 + (nA -  1)0] >
*  ) D ETl2
(17b)
± [ & A
30 i dz ,





























































































_a_\^P a (2 -  8)[2 * (n, * nB -  1)6] * nAnB( #  + 4 n  Q (1?d)
DET11
As the number of domestic firms increases, the number of firms in the market whose 
relative costs are not directly affected by exchange rate fluctuations goes up and the 
magnitude of the passthrough of exchange rate fluctuations to the prices of domestic varieties 
goes down. Among the other effects which may be laid at the feet of a concentrated market 
is an enhanced sensibility to exchange rate fluctuations. On the other hand, an increase in 
n, increases the passthrough to prices of domestic varieties because it increases the number 
of varieties whose relative costs are directly affected by exchange rate fluctuations.
As 6 increases, domestic varieties become better and better substitutes one for another. 
As a result, the common equilibrium price of domestic varieties falls toward t T h i s  means 
that there is less of a range within which exchange rate fluctuations can affect prices of 
domestic varieties. As i|r increases, foreign varieties become better substitutes for domestic 
varieties, so exchange rate fluctuations have a greater impact on p,. The fact that (17c) and 
(17d) are of opposite sign explains why dpJdO is of ambiguous sign if 0 and i)r are 
constrained to be equal.































































































= [2 + (n. -  1)0]




j_ (^ a | = ("a ~ + P * (nA ~ neiK  - i) > Q
« l a z j  d e t i 2
(18c)
0l|l
2 + (n. -  1)0 
2n./i.i|i-------------------  > 0
" DETI2
(18d)
As the number ot domestic firms increases, or the number of foreign firms decreases, 
the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on the prices of foreign varieties decreases. As 
domestic varieties become better substitutes one for another, and as foreign varieties become 
better substitutes for domestic varieties, the magnitude of dpjdz  goes up.
IV. Complementary Goods
I . The Model
We examine the case in which all domestic varieties are substitutes, all foreign 
varieties are substitutes, but foreign and domestic varieties are complements.5 For 
expositional convenience, we substitute <t> = - ♦  in the demand curves (3). <t> lies between 
zero and one, and is the degree of complementarity between domestic and foreign goods. 




























































































2. Exchange Rate Comparative Statics
When foreign and domestic varieties are complements, the condensed reaction curves 
of quantity-setting firms slope upward. The slope and intercept conditions tor the existence 
of positive equilibrium outputs for firms in both countries are derived in a straightforward 
way. Equilibrium prices are





[2 + (nA -  l)0](a -  I) + nAQ(a - cA) 
DET1
(19b)
.. n<& < 0 . (20)
*  DET1
^Pb _ j 2 * («a ~ D6 
dz DET1
(21)
The signs of the comparative static partial derivatives (17b), (17c). and (!7d) are reversed. 
The sign of (17a) is positive if 02 t  <t>2. (18a) remains negative, and (18d) remains positive 




























































































V. Price-setting firms 
1. The Model
To model price-setting firms, it is necessary to solve the system of inverse demand 
curves and obtain the implied demand curves. As suggested by (5) and (6), it is convenient 
to express the quantity demanded as a function of deviations of price from marginal cost. 
For notational compactness, we will write
Pm  = Pm  ~ ca Pbj ^  P *  ~ z ’ (22)
where z = e(c, + t,J .
Demand curves are then (see Appendix)
(1 - 0 ) 0 ^  = {[1 a (nB -  l)0J(fl -  c4) -  n„1f(a -  z)} a (© -  ~
"» 02 _
+'\>Y,Pb, - H + ("a * nB ~ 2>e + ("a " lK ~,---Z~Pm
i=i 1 - 0
E PmJi*k
(23a)
(1 -  0 )0**  = ([1 a (nt  -  l)0](a -  z) -  n ^ ( a  -  cA)\ a j© a ~ * ' ]e P*






























































































D - (1 0)[1 + (nA + nB 1)61 * V b ^ ' ' ~ > 0 (24>1 - 0
2. Reaction Functions
Return to the case of substitute varieties. Using the demand curves (23a) and (23b) 
to express profits (5) and (6) in terms of prices, the equations of the price reaction curves of 
firms A1 and B1 are
2 1 + ("a * ns ~ 2)0 + (/)„ -  l)n„
02 t|r2 
1 - 6 (Pa , ~
0 + n,
02 - r|r
1 -  0
[1 v («„
E (Pa< - ci> 't'E (Pb, =)
i-2 1-!
l)0](n c .)  <|inB(a z)
(25a)
and
1 + ("a + nH -  2)6 * n J n .  - 1)
B2 - »2
♦ E  (Pa< - - 6 + n
02
1 - 6 (Pb Z)
1






Imposing country-specific symmetry in (25), we obtain the equations of condensed 





























































































" ««tCPs -  z) = [1 + (nB -  l)0](o -  cA) -  i|mB(a -  z) ;
(26b)
" nA'\>(PA ~ cA) = [1 + (nA -  l)6](a -  z) -  nAty(a -  cA) .
The condensed reaction curves are graphed in Figure 2. From (23), the intercepts of 
the reaction curves with the lines p„ = z, p t = c, have the indicated configuration provided 
that there is positive demand for each variety if all varieties price at marginal cost.
The existence of equilibrium requires that the slope of the country A firm reaction 
function be greater than 1, while the slope of the country B firm reaction function is less than 
one. This requires that
I»2 > 0 •
(27)




























































































3. Exchange Rate Comparative Statics
From (26), one obtains the equilibrium prices when firms set prices:
2 + (2n.+ni -3)6 + n , ( n „ l )
DET2(pA -  cA) = 
62 -  t|r2
1 -  e
~nnV 1 + K +”* -2)e + n A n .- l)
[1 + (ns -l)0 ] -  W T f  (a-cA) ( 28a)
62 - i|t2
1 0 (a z)
DET2(pB -  z) -  
- *:2 + («,+211,-3)0 ♦ (nA-l)n B- j
|1 + (,nA+nB- 2)0 + (nA-\)n
[1 + ( " i - l)0] '  nAnB ^  (Q-z) (28b)
02 - i|r2̂
1 - 0
(a -  e 4)
From (28), we have
3Pa
dz
nBV 1 + (nA + nB ~ 2 )0 + »*(«» ~ !)











































































































Whether firms set prices or quantities, an increase in e leads to a relative increase in price 
of foreign goods.6
4. Complementary GixmIs
The condensed reaction curves for price-setting firms slope upward when foreign and 
domestic varieties are complements. The intercept conditions for equilibrium prices to exceed 







































































































l +(nA+nK~2)d+nA(nB- l ) e2- t 2
l-e
(32b




V. Economies of scale 
1. The model
If increases in output reduce marginal cost, the effect should be to reduce the 
magnitude of the passthrough of exchange rate fluctuations to domestic prices. 1 he intuition 
is straightforward: even if an exchange rate movement reduces the revenue that a country 
B firm earns from its sales in country A, the country B firm will have an incentive to 
maintain its sales in country A, for the sake of the cost reductions that those sales generate. 
This means that output will fluctuate less than would otherwise be the case. But if economies 
of scale reduce the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on output, they reduce the impact of 
exchange rate fluctuations on price.
It suffices to demonstrate this effect in the simplest possible model. Suppose one firm 




























































































transportation costs are zero, anil let the cost functions of the country A firm and the country 
B firm he
respectively. By assuming d, 8 > 0, we obtain a model in which increases in output reduce 
marginal cost. By making these cost reductions functions of the squares of output in each 
country, we once again obtain a model in which country A and country B sales decisions can 
be analyzed separately.’ We also assume that d and 8 are sufficiently small so that both 
firms produce positive outputs in equilibrium.
2. Quantity-setting equilibrium
Given our assumption that products are homogeneous, we confine ourselves to the 
analysis of quantity-setting behavior. The equations of the country A reaction functions are
Ca(< ?W  = ca^ a + x a> -  d^ A  + *a)
(33a)
C M )  = CB^B + V  -  5 ( ? 1 + **) (33b)
2(1 -  d)qA + xB = a -  cA (34a)
qA + 2(1 -  &)xB = a (34b)
Solving (34), equilibrium outputs are




























































































2(1 -  d)(a -  ecB) -  (a - cA) 
DETa
(35b)
where DETA = 4(1 - d)(l - 8) - 1. We will assume that d and 8 are sufficiently small so that 
DET, > 0.
In equilibrium, total output is
«a
(1 - 2e8)(a -  cA) + ( l  -  2d)(a -  ecB)
DBTa
(35c)
Substituting the results into the equation of the market demand curve. Cournot 
equilibrium price is
Pa = c A *( .  1 M )




Pa = ecB + (1 -  2c5)
2(1 -  d)(a -  ecg) -  (a -  cA)
deta
(36b)
3. Exchange Rate Comparative Statics
It is easiest to understand the impact of exchange rate fluctuations on equilibrium price 


































































































—  -  - 2(1 -  6) — —  
de DET.
+ 46(1
2(1 -  d)(a  -  ecB) -  (a -  c.) 
d )------------ ---------L.---- 1------- tL (37b)
DEI2,
d) cb 2d  " d^ a ~ ec«) '  * ca>-------  + 10 -----------------------------------------
DETa DEI2,
(37c)
From equations (37) and for d, 6 sufficiently small, an increase in e (a depreciation 
of the country A currency) causes the equilibrium exports of the country B firm to country 
A to fall, but not by as much as if returns to scale were constant. This reflects a shift in the 
country B reaction curve and a movement of equilibrium along the country A reaction curve. 
The equilibrium output of the country A firm rises, but not by as much as if returns to scale 
were constant. Total output falls, but not by as much as if returns to scale were constant.
The presence of economies of scale moderates the impact of exchange rate changes 
on output. This tends to stabilize country A price:
1 & a _ ca _ 25 2(1 ~ d)(a  ~ ecB> -  (a -  ca> (3g)
l -  2d de DET, DET^




























































































1 For simplicity, we ignore the effects of uncertainty. Hooper and Kohlhagen 11978) and 
Katz, Paroush, and Kahana 11982) incorporate uncertainty in models of exchange rate 
determination. Neither model is well suited to the examination of the connection between 
elements of market structure and the nature of passthrough effects.
2. Allowing for notational differences, this is the model of Spence |1976|. It can be 
investigated for its own sake as a generalization of the homogeneous product linear demand 
case, or it can he rationalized as the outcome of a utility maximization process by a 
representative consumer with a quadratic utility function. For discussion of the latter 
approach, see Kirman 119921.
3. See the equations (23) of the demand curves.
4. Since ir„ =  (pA, - cJqAI, the equation of firm Al ' s  reaction curve can be written in
dp.,
implicit form as pAI cA = qAl------ = qA1. Similarly pBj - z  = q„. as in (12b).
^A1
5. For concreteness, one may consider the case in which nA domestic firms produce pairs of 
shoes while n„ foreign firms produce pairs of socks.
6. From (29) it is possible to calculate the comparative static derivatives that correspond to 



























































































is less than would be the case it' returns to scale were constant.
VI. Conclusion
The extent to which exchange rate fluctuations are passed on to domestic prices 
depends on substitutability/complementarity relationships among varieties produced by 
domestic and foreign firms and on the extent of economies of scale.
When all varieties are substitutes, the passthrough of exchange rate fluctuations rises 
with the degree of substitutability. A depreciation of the home country currency causes a 
relative increase in the prices of foreign varieties. Exchange rate passthroughs are less, all 
else equal, in unconcentrated markets.
If. on the other hand, foreign varieties are complementary to domestic varieties, a 
depreciation of the home country currency causes a reduction in the price of domestic 
varieties. This is the expected effect, since such a depreciation causes complementary foreign 
varieties to become more expensive.
Further, if firms are able to reduce marginal cost by increasing output, the impact of 





























































































7. The leading alternative specification is to let the coefficient of d be the square of total 
output of the country A firm and the coefficient of ô be the square of total output of the 
country B firm. Analysis of equilibrium in this case will yield results qualitatively similar 



























































































Appendix: Derivation of demand curves.




<« -  CA»A
(a -  z)JB
(Al)
where pA' is a column vector of prices of country A varieties and pB’ is a column vector of 
prices of country B varieties, measured in deviations from marginal cost. JA is a column 
vector of nA ones; J„ is a column vector of n„ ones. M is the n by n square vector









♦ V a 0 + n
e2 - y
l - e VA
(A4)
and D given by (24).Application of the inverse matrix (A4) to the system of equations (Al) 
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Figure 2: Symmetric reaction curves. Country A, 0 > 0.
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